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The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
Conclusion
Introduction
Preliminaries
The difference between the best reply and the refined best reply correspondence
Nash equilibrium versus best reply refinements
-CURB sets and strategic stability
A cheap-talk example
Conclusion
On the generic equivalence of best responses and refined best responses
Refined best replies in two-player games
Arbeitspapier
The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
Entstehung
2012
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