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The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
Nash equilibrium versus best reply refinements
Introduction
Preliminaries
The difference between the best reply and the refined best reply correspondence
Nash equilibrium versus best reply refinements
-CURB sets and strategic stability
A cheap-talk example
Conclusion
On the generic equivalence of best responses and refined best responses
Refined best replies in two-player games
Arbeitspapier
The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
Entstehung
2012
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