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Stability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition
Further Results
Introduction
The Tax Competition Model
Cooperative Behavior
Dynamic Stability of Cooperation
The setting
Cooperation and punishment tax revenues
Deviation tax rates and tax revenues
The discount factor
Welfare maximization
Numerical Example
Equilibrium tax rates and tax revenues for five regions
A repeated game with five regions
Conclusion
Appendix
Best response functions with coalition structures
Optimal tax rates with coalition structures
Optimal tax rate and revenue under deviating behavior
Computation of the minimum discount factor
Further Results
Maximizing Welfare
Cooperative behavior
Repeated interaction
A numerical example for five regions
Working Paper
Stability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition
Place and Date of Creation
2012
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