Content

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   9783515130516 2
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   9783515130516 3
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   9783515130516 4
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   9783515130516 5
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   INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
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   ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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   INTRODUCTION: THE LOGIC OF THE IMAGINATION: SPACE, TIME, PREDICTIONS
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   1. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE IMAGINATION
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   2. CONTENT SUMMARY
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   3. METHODOLOGY
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   I. THE EXPRESSIVE POWER OF THE MIND AND ITS VARIETIES
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   1. IDEAS AS DISPOSITIONS TO FORM EXPRESSIONS
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   2. EXPRESSION AND ITS INTERPRETATION
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   3. COGNITIVE DESIDERATA FOR A THEORY OF EXPRESSION
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   4. EXPRESSION AND BLIND THOUGHT
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   5. EXPRESSION AND ITS METAPHYSICAL MEANING
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   6. IS COGNITIVE AND EPISTEMIC USE OF EXPRESSION UNIVOCAL?
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   7. CONCLUSION
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   II. THE GROUNDWORK OF THE IMAGINATION
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   1. THE SYNTHETIC WORK OF IMAGINATION
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   2. THE LOGIC OF THE IMAGINATION, ITS COGNITIVE CONSTRAINTS
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   3. SEGMENTATION AND SIMPLIFICATION
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   4. CONFUSED SENSATION AND DISTINGUISHED PERCEPTION
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   5. CONCLUSION
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   III. INTERLUDE: IMAGINATION AND REALITY
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   1. SEGMENTATION, SIMPLIFICATION, AND THE METAPHYSICAL GROUND FOR THEIR REALITY
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   2. SENSATIONS AS EXPRESSIONS
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   3. SEGMENTATION AS EXPRESSION
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   4. COMBINATORIC OF ELEMENTS VS PROPOSITIONAL CONTAINMENT
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   5. COHERENCE, MOTION, AND THE METAPHYSICAL CONSTITUTION OF BODIES
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   6. COHERENCE AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION
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   7. CONCLUSION
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   IV. FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER COHERENCE I: TIME, SPACE, AND TYPES
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   1. WHAT ARE TYPES?
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   2. NATURE AS THE INTENTIONAL OBJECT OF TYPES
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   3. SPACE AND TIME: A FIRST-ORDER COHERENCE
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   4. SPACE, TIME, CAUSATION: LEIBNIZ’S EMPIRICAL PRINCIPLE
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   5. CONCLUSION
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   V. FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER COHERENCE II: MODALITIES AND TYPES
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   1. FIRST-ORDER COHERENCE AND ITS LIMITS
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   2. FIRST-ORDER COHERENCE AND MODALITIES
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   3. SECOND-ORDER COHERENCE AND ITS CONSTRAINTS
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   4. CONCLUSION
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   VI. SIMILARITY, MOVEMENT, AND THE INTERIORIZATION OF TYPES
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   1. HOW DO WE INTERIORIZE TYPES?
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   2. SIMILARITY AND THE INTERIORIZATION OF TYPES
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   3. SIMILARITY, ABSTRACTION, AND GENERAL NOTIONS
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   4. SIMILARITY, ABSTRACTION, GENERAL NOTIONS IN NEW ESSAYS
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   5. IMAGINATION AS A COMBINATORIC FACULTY
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   6. CONCLUSION
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   VII. WHY TYPES ARE NOT CONCEPTS
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   1. TYPES VS. CONCEPTS – EXTENSION VS. INTENSION
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   2. LEIBNIZ’S CONCEPTUALISM
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   3. ALIA EST RERUM, ALIA TERMINORUM DIVISIO23
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   4. FROM TYPES TO CONCEPTS
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   5. TYPES, CONCEPTS, AND TERMS
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   6. THE CONCEPTUALIST RESPONSE
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   7. CONCLUSION
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   VIII. CONCEPTUALISM, REAL DISTINCTIONS, AND ERROR
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   1. GENERALIZATIONS AND NATURAL LANGUAGES
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   2. GENERALIZATIONS AND ESSENCES
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   3. LOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND PHYSICAL GENUS
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   4. MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SPECIES
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   5. ON ERROR
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   6. CONCLUSION
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   IX. LEIBNIZ’S INNATISM
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   1. INNATE IDEAS
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   2. A MODERATE INNATISM
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   3. THE MIND AS A DARK ROOM
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   4. THE MIND AS AN ARCHITECT
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   5. TWO DESIDERATA FOR LEIBNIZ’S THEORY OF INNATE IDEAS
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   6. CONCLUSION
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   CONCLUSION: CONTOURING THE IMAGINATION
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   ABBREVIATION
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   REFERENCES
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   9783515130516 288
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   9783515130516 289
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   9783515130516 290