Inhalt

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   Contents
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   List of Figures
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   List of Tables
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   List of Acronyms
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   List of Symbols
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  1 Introduction
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   1.1 Background, Motivation, and Scope
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   1.2 Outline and Contribution
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   1.3 Notation
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   2 Preliminaries
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   2.1 Principles of Steganography
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   2.1.1 Set-Up of a Steganographic System
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  2.1.2 Embedding Operations
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   2.1.2.1 LSB Replacement
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   2.1.2.2 LSB Matching
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  2.1.3 Embedding Strategies
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   2.1.3.1 (Initial) Sequential Embedding
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   2.1.3.2 Random Uniform Embedding
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   2.1.3.3 Side-Informed Embedding
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  2.2 Security in Steganographic Systems
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   2.2.1 The Prisoners' Problem
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   2.2.2 Theoretical Security Notions
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   2.2.2.1 Information-Theoretic Approach
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   2.2.2.2 Complexity-Theoretic Approach
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  2.2.3 Empirical Security Notions
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   2.2.3.1 Receiver Operating Characteristic
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   2.2.3.2 Single Number Measures
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   2.3 Summary
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  3 Exploiting Side Information in Steganalysis
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  3.1 Side Information in Steganalysis
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   3.1.1 Steganographic Side Information and Uncertainty
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   3.1.1.1 Steganographic Side Information
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   3.1.1.2 Uncertainty
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   3.1.1.3 Common Use of Side Information in Steganography
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  3.1.2 Initial Evidence
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   3.1.2.1 Targeted Attack on PSP Steganography
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   3.1.2.2 The Detectability Profile
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   3.1.3 Formalizing Adaptive Steganography and Steganalysis
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  3.2 Powerful Steganalysis of LSB Replacement
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   3.2.1 Asymptotically Uniformly Most Powerful Test
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   3.2.2 Weighted Stego-Image Steganalysis
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   3.2.2.1 WS Steganalysis for Sequential Embedding
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   3.2.2.2 WS Steganalysis for Naïve Adaptive Embedding
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  3.3 A Targeted Attack on Naïve Adaptive Embedding
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   3.3.1 Overview of Adaptivity Criteria
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   3.3.2 Data and Set-up
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   3.3.3 Evaluation Strategy
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  3.3.4 Attacked Adaptivity Criteria
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   3.3.4.1 Local Variance
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   3.3.4.2 Edges
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   3.3.4.3 Texture
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   3.3.4.4 NUGO (Not so Undetectable steGO)
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   3.3.5 Recoverability of the Adaptivity Criteria
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   3.3.6 Empirical Results – Detecting Naïve Adaptive Embedding
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   3.4 Summary
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  4 Game Theory and Steganography
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   4.1 Motivation
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  4.2 Principles of Game Theory
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   4.2.1 Basic Definitions of Game Theory
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  4.2.2 Solution Concepts
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   4.2.2.1 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
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   4.2.2.2 Nash Equilibrium
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   4.2.2.3 Maxmin and Minmax Strategy
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   4.2.2.4 Equalizer Strategies
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  4.3 Game-Theoretical Approaches in Steganography
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   4.3.1 Game Theory and Capacity
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   4.3.2 Game Theory and Batch Steganography
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   4.3.3 Game Theory and Detection Performance
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   4.3.4 Game Theory and Adaptive LSB Matching
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  4.4 The Game-Theoretical Framework
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   4.4.1 Basic Definitions
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   4.4.2 Set-Up and Knowledge
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   4.4.3 Strategies
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   4.5 Summary
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   5 Game-Theoretic Insights
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   5.1 Cover Models with Binary Embedding Positions
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  5.1.1 Restricted Steganalyst Model
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   5.1.1.1 Strategies
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   5.1.1.2 Payoff
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   5.1.1.3 Solving the Game
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   5.1.1.4 Numerical Illustration
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   5.1.2 Powerful Steganalyst and Fixed Net Embedding
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   5.1.2.1 Strategies
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   5.1.2.2 Embedding Impact
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   5.1.2.3 Payoff
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   5.1.2.4 Solving the Game
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   5.1.2.5 Solution and Numerical Illustration for n=2 and k=1
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  5.1.3 Powerful Steganalyst and Independent Embedding
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   5.1.3.1 Strategies
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   5.1.3.2 Embedding Impact
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   5.1.3.3 Payoff
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   5.1.3.4 Solving the Game
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   5.1.3.5 Solution and Numerical Illustration for n=2 and k=1
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   5.1.4 Summary
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   5.2 Cover Models with Two Embedding Positions
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  5.2.1 Linear Increasing PMF
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   5.2.1.1 Cover Generation
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   5.2.1.2 Embedding Impact
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   5.2.1.3 Eve's Decision: Optimal Local Detector
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   5.2.1.4 Error Rates and Payoff
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   5.2.1.5 Solving the Game
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  5.2.2 Constant Ratio PMF
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   5.2.2.1 Cover Generation and Justification
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   5.2.2.2 Embedding Impact
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   5.2.2.3 Heterogeneity
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   5.2.2.4 Eve's Decision: Optimal Local Detector
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   5.2.2.5 Error Rates and Payoff
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   5.2.2.6 Solving the Game
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   5.2.3 Imperfect Recoverability
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   5.2.3.1 Imperfect Recovery with Linear Increasing PMF
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   5.2.3.2 Imperfect Recovery with Constant Ratio PMF
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  5.2.4 Numerical Illustrations
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   5.2.4.1 Numerical Illustration for Linear Increasing PMF
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   5.2.4.2 Numerical Illustration for Constant Ratio PMF
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   5.2.4.3 Comparison
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   5.2.5 Type of Game
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   5.2.6 Discussion and Summary
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  5.3 Lessons Learned and Limitations
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   5.3.1 Lessons Learned – Secure Adaptive Steganography
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   5.3.2 Limitations
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  6 Conclusion
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  6.1 Summary of Results
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   6.1.1 Formalizing Side Information in Steganography
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   6.1.2 Game-Theoretical Modeling of Steganography
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   6.2 Outlook and Future Research
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   Bibliography
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  A Information-Theoretic Derivations
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   A.1 Derivation of Definition 3.2
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   A.2 Derivation of Remark 3.9
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  B Game Theory in Related Fields
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   B.1 Multimedia Forensics
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   B.2 Digital Watermarking
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   B.3 Adversarial Classification
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  C Omitted Proofs
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   C.1 Proof of Lemma 5.11
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   C.2 Proof of Lemma 5.12
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   C.3 Proof of Lemma 5.13
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   C.4 Proof of Lemma 5.14
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   C.5 Proof of Lemma 5.15
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   D Curriculum Vitae