Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman: Essays on finitely repeated games. 2019
Inhalt
- Introduction
- A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
- Introduction
- Model and definitions
- Main result
- Discussion and extension
- Case of the Nash solution
- Alternative statement of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
- Case with discounting
- Relation with the literature
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1: Proof of the Complete perfect folk theorem
- On the existence of the limit set of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game
- The recursive feasibility of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game
- Necessity of the recursive effective minimax payoff for the complete perfect folk theorem
- Sufficiency of the recursive feasibility and the recursive effective individual rationality
- Appendix 2: Proof of the complete Nash folk theorem
- On the existence of the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game
- On the Nash feasibility of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game
- Proof of Theorem 2
- Appendix 3: In case there exists a discount factor
- A note on ``Necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect finite horizon folk theorem" [Econometrica, 63 (2): 425-430, 1995.
- Introduction
- The counter-example
- Smith's model
- A proof of Smith's folk theorem
- Proof of intermediate results
- Repetition and cooperation: A model of finitely repeated games with objective ambiguity
- Introduction
- The Model
- Main result and discussion
- Conclusion
- Appendix 4: Proofs
- Infinitely repeated games with discounting. What changes if players are allowed to use imprecise devices.