Günther, Michael: Theory and application of renegotiation in repeated games. 2017
Inhalt
- Introduction
- International Environmental Agreements for Local and Global Pollution
- Introduction
- Background and Literature Review
- A Pollution Game of Local and Global Spillovers
- Stable IEAs in Infinitely Repeated Games
- The Stability of a Global IEA
- Social Benefits and Costs
- Extensions
- Conclusion
- Appendix
- A Note on Renegotiation in Repeated Games
- Introduction
- Basics and Original Result
- The Error in the Proof of Farrell and Maskin (1989)
- Corrected Proof of Theorem 3.1
- Proof of Proposition 3.1
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Extending Weak Renegotiation-Proofness to n-Player Games
- Introduction
- Related Literature
- Notation and Standard Concepts in Repeated Games
- Motivation
- The Model
- Characterization of R-WRP Equilibrium Payoffs
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- References