Inhalt

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   Table of contents
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   1 Dynamic Contracts in Search Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information
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   1.1 Introduction
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   1.2 Competitive search with exogenous separations
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   1.2.1 The competitive search equilibrium under full information
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   1.2.2 The allocation under asymmetric information
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   1.3 Competitive search with endogenous separations
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   1.3.1 Ex ante heterogeneity, quitting choice and dynamic contracts
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   1.3.2 Ex post heterogeneity and credible commitment
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   1.4 Extension: A three-period framework
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   1.5 Conclusion
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  1.6 Appendix
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   1.6.1 Proof of the Proposition 1
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   1.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
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   1.6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
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   1.6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
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   1.6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
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   1.6.6 Proof of Proposition 6
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   1.6.7 Proof of Proposition 7
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   1.6.8 Proof of Lemma 1
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   1.6.9 Proof of Proposition 9
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   1.6.10 Proof of Proposition 1.6.10
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   2 Age-directed Policy in Competitive Search Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information
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   2.1 Introduction
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  2.2 Exogenous quitting probability and age-specific UB
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   2.2.1 Model Assumptions
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   2.2.2 Equilibrium
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   2.2.3 Redistributive age-specific UB
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  2.3 Endogenous participation choice before search and age-specific UB
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   2.3.1 Equilibrium
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   2.3.2 Age-Specific UB
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  2.4 Ex-post asymmetric information, participation choices after matching and age-specific UB
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   2.4.1 The model
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   2.4.2 Redistribution by age.
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   2.5 Discussion on the robustness of the results
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   2.6 Conclusion
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   2.7 Appendix
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   3 Holdup and Hiring Discrimination with Search Friction
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   3.1 Introduction
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   3.1.1 Relation to the literature
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   3.2 The model without discrimination
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   3.2.1 Specification of the strategies, matching probabilities, and payoff functions.
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   3.2.2 Constrained efficient allocations
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   3.3 The model with hiring discrimination
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   3.3.1 The case of strong discrimination: x=1
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   3.3.2 Existing results revisited and reinterpreted
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   3.3.3 Analysis under our context
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   3.4 Comparison with fixed sharing rule (wage bargaining)
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   3.5 Discussion
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   3.6 Conclusion
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   3.7 Appendix
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   4 ``Market Power and Efficiency in a Search Model'' Revisited
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   4.1 Introduction
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   4.2 The model
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   4.2.1 The market economy
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   4.2.2 The social planner's problem
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   4.2.3 Policy implications
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   4.2.4 Critics
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  4.3 Further discussions
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   4.3.1 On funding source of unemployment benefit
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   4.3.2 Imposing wage to be a fixed proportion of productivity
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   4.4 Conclusion
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   4.5 Appendix
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   References