Cardona, Andrés: Social closure in markets, families, and networks: explaining the emergence of intergroup inequality as a result of exclusionary action across context [...]. 2015
Inhalt
- Introduction: mechanisms, inequality, and closure
- I. Social mechanisms
- 1 Social mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology
- 1.1 Philosophical considerations
- 1.2 The sociological reception
- 1.2.1 Leading advocates of a mechanistic approach in sociology
- 1.2.2 Difficulties in implementing a mechanistic approach
- 1.3 Taking stock: why and how mechanisms in sociology?
- 1.3.1 Which are the advantages of adopting a mechanistic approach?
- 1.3.2 Which are the core elements of the mechanistic approach and how should they be put into practice?
- 1.4 Summary
- II. Defining social closure
- 2 Weber's definition of closure
- 2.1 Group closure
- 2.2 Market closure
- 2.3 An example: Accountants in UK between 1957 and 1970
- 2.4 Is closing the market independent from closing the group?
- 2.5 Why were the two meanings of closure conflated in the first place?
- 2.6 Summary
- 3 A new definition: closure as exclusionary action
- 3.1 The neo-Weberian conceptual expansion: Parkin and Murphy
- 3.1.1 Parkin: the role of unintended consequences
- 3.1.2 Murphy: from explanation to mere description
- 3.2 The demands of empirical research on the concept of closure: Tilly and Roscigno
- 3.2.1 Tilly's relaxation of collective actors
- 3.2.2 Roscigno's emphasis on individual agency and interaction
- 3.3 Closure as exclusionary action
- 3.3.1 A general, action-based definition of closure
- 3.3.2 Forms of closure as exclusionary action: motives and forms of interaction
- 3.3.3 Further examples
- 3.3.4 The `closure space'
- 3.4 Summary
- III. Closure and inequality in markets, families, and networks
- 4 Closure in markets: closing the group or the market?
- 4.1 Individual and group competition: four causal paths
- 4.2 Model description
- 4.3 Experimental design
- 4.4 Results
- 4.4.1 Pure individual competition
- 4.4.2 Individual competition through group membership
- 4.4.3 Group competition through group closure
- 4.4.4 Pure group competition through market closure
- 4.4.5 All processes at the same time
- 4.5 Summary
- 5 Closure in families: parental choices and children's skills
- 5.1 Beyond optimizing parents: heuristics and norms
- 5.2 Model description
- 5.3 Experimental design
- 5.4 Results
- 5.4.1 Experiment 1: egalitarian vs. non-egalitarian parents
- 5.4.2 Experiment 2: egalitarian vs. optimizing parents
- 5.5 Validation
- 5.6 Summary
- 6 Closure in networks: language skills and friendship ties
- 6.1 Data and measures
- 6.2 Methods: exponential random graph models (ERGM)
- 6.3 Results
- 6.3.1 Descriptive and bivariate results
- 6.3.2 ERGM: maximum likelihood estimates (MLE)
- 6.3.3 ERGM: Bayesian estimates with imputed data
- 6.3.4 Sensitivity analysis: higher-order parameters
- 6.3.5 Discussion: the effect of language on tie formation
- 6.4 Summary
- IV. Concluding remarks